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ABSTRACT: Virtue argumentation theory provides the best framework for accommodating the notion
of an argument that is “fully satisfying” in a robust and integrated sense. The process of explicating
the notion of fully satisfying arguments requires expanding the concept of arguers to include all of an
argument’s participants, including judges, juries, and interested spectators. And that, in turn,
requires expanding the concept of an argument itself to include its entire context.
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE VIRTUES OF OSSA
I would be remiss if I did not begin by expressing my deep gratitude to the
conference organizers for the opportunity to be one of this year’s keynote speakers.
It is a privilege and honor, but the responsibility has caused me no end of
sleeplessness for many months now. More than that, however, I would like to thank
Tony and Ralph and Chris and Hans, and now Cate, for the dedication and energy
they have invested in establishing and sustaining this conference over the years, and
for their important, intelligent, and graceful contributions to the field of
argumentation theory.
I have grown especially fond of the OSSA conference because not only has it
been an exemplary forum for thinking and learning and, of course, arguing, about
good argumentation, but it has also been a showcase for good argumentation. The
system of commentators, together with the opportunity for replies in the
Proceedings, and the culture of collegiality all bring out the best in us as arguers. It
has fostered the exchange of ideas and provided the chance to argue, reflect and
revise, all within an open and supportive environment. To put it in more timely
words, this conference brings out the virtues of argumentation and puts them on
display.
Not surprisingly, then, OSSA has been an occasion for some very good
arguments – some very, very good arguments. On at least a couple of occasions,
arguments so good that they left me almost speechless – so satisfied that there was
nothing left to say.
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Think about that for a moment: an argument that can leave a philosopher
speechless? Now that’s a good argument.1
We could take that as a starting point – the idea of an argument so good that
it completely satisfies its participants – but let us be less presumptuous and take it
as a starting goal.
Instead, let me start with the conference theme: the Virtues of
Argumentation. It is a phrase rich with meanings, reflecting some of the different
ways we can think about arguments. Two readings in particular stand out: First, it
can be read as referring to the various positives attributes that argumentation has
as a means of settling disputes, as a method for arriving at truths, or for any of the
many other ways in which argumentation is a good thing. Alternatively, it can be
interpreted as referring to the virtues exhibited by arguers in arguments, rather
than by argumentation. What positive attributes are exhibited by arguers when
those arguers are arguing well?
Is there anything more than an accidental, homonymic connection between
these two ways of reading the phrase, “the virtues of argumentation”? The question
of how good arguing is conducive to what arguing is good for cannot be ignored
when trying to answer the question of how good arguing could lead to arguments
that are good – especially when the goal is arguments that are that good. The larger
question of the nature of argumentation informs all subsidiary discussions, so if we
focus too narrowly on either good arguments or good arguing, we run the risk of
missing something important.
So, what I would like to do is connect virtuous arguing with satisfying
arguments and the value of argumentation. There are, then, three bearers of value to
ask about:
 What makes an arguer praiseworthy;
 What makes an argument praiseworthy;
 What makes argumentation praiseworthy.
Now that’s what I would like to do, but unfortunately, I lack the talents to succeed at
such an ambitious project. Mercifully, I lack the hubris to even try, so, instead, I will
focus more narrowly on the virtues of virtue as a tool for theorizing. Virtues, I shall
argue, provide a particularly good lens for thinking about our questions, but
ultimately there are limits to their theoretical utility. They cannot underwrite a
complete account.
2. WHENCE VIRTUES?
The history of my thoughts about virtue and argument runs right through OSSA, so if
you will indulge me just a little longer, I’d like to rehearse some of that history
because I think it helps to explain how we can get from thinking about arguments to
thinking about virtues, why the field of argumentation and virtues is so fertile, but
also why in the end we will need to move beyond traditional thinking about virtues.
1
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The first mention that I heard of “Virtue Argumentation” came in 2006. I had
presented a paper at the 2005 OSSA meetings about a peculiar class of especially
bad arguments that I labelled “Backfiring Arguments” because the effect they end up
having is to lower rather than enhance the credibility of their target conclusions. It
takes a heroically bad arguer to pull that off, and I explored some of the features of
arguers that could lead to contribute to that sort of misfire. The principal virtue of
that paper was that it managed to elicit a very good response from Andrew
Aberdein, the OSSA-assigned commentator. Aberdein built upon that commentary in
the paper he presented the next year at ISSA in Amsterdam entitled, “Virtue
Argumentation.”2 In that presentation, he referred to my paper and to me as, and I
quote, “a virtue argumentation theorist avant la letter.” He then announced that he
was in fact publicly “outing me” as a Virtue Argumentation Theorist.
Prior to that, I had not thought about the connection between Virtue
Epistemology and Argumentation Theory, so for that piece of generous
“hermeneutical ventriloquism” I am very grateful. The juxtaposition of those ideas
helped crystallize my thoughts and bring into focus two distinct but convergent
pathways from virtues to arguments.
3. A TRADITIONAL STORY
The first, shorter path linking virtues and arguments is best told in a story. It’s an
old story, one that some of you have undoubtedly heard before, quite possibly from
me because it is one that I rather enjoy telling. I think it bears repeating:
Many years ago, at one of the large synagogues in New York serving a congregation of
immigrants from around the world, there was a heated dispute that threatened to tear
the congregation apart. Should the canonical prayer, Shema Y’Isroel, be recited seated
or standing? Rather than let the argument destroy the congregation, they all agreed to
defer to the Rabbi who would be hired when their current one, who was already quite
old, retired. The time came and they conducted an exhaustive international search,
settling on a Rabbi with an impeccable reputation as a brilliant scholar. When he
arrived at the temple, he was immediately surrounded by elders from the
congregation.
“Rabbi, Rabbi,” one elder asked, “Isn’t it traditional for the Shema to be said
while seated?”
The Rabbi paused, stroked his beard, and then said, “No, that is not the
tradition.”
“Aha!” another elder exclaimed. “So we were right! The tradition is to stand
when reciting the Shema, isn’t that so, Rabbi?”
“No, that is not the tradition either,” came the reply.
“But, Rabbi,” said another, “we’ve been arguing about it for years!”
“That’s the tradition!”

If you are like me and find nothing especially conceptually odd about the idea
of recreational argument, then perhaps you’ll also find nothing odd about a tradition
of arguing either, but there is indeed something peculiar about it. It’s not just that
some of the details of the Talmudic tradition of pilpul argumentation are so
2
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interestingly idiosyncratic. The same can be said about the Buddhist Gelukpa
tradition of argumentation (rtsod pa) or any other argument-centered tradition. The
oddity is in the very idea of a tradition of argument. Isn’t arguing about differences
while traditions are about community? Yes, and it is true that one of the things that
arguments can do is resolve differences, but in order for arguing to be a positive
constituent of a tradition, arguing cannot be understood simply as a way of
eliminating (negative) differences. Nor can it be thought of as a means to truth and
knowledge or even as a manifestation of an individual’s rationality. Arguing would
have to be a way of participating in the community. If arguing is to be part of a
tradition, it cannot be about who I am or what I do; it’s about who we are and what
we do. We argue with one another, not in isolation.
It is the doing not the deed that matters, and the doing is a communal effort.
Admittedly, when I say this, I have tipped my hand. I am not thinking of
arguments as abstract structures of inferentially connected propositions. Otherwise,
simply presenting valid arguments would make one part of the tradition, but that is
not so. It’s not enough to walk around saying, “Socrates is Greek; All Greeks are
mortal; Therefore Socrates is mortal.” That isn’t arguing: it isn’t honoring a tradition;
it’s being eccentric.
Obviously, something more is needed to make logical inferences into
dynamic, vital arguments capable of centering a tradition. And that something more
is arguing with others. But even that is not enough, otherwise being excessively
argumentative would make one a pillar of the community! What’s needed is not just
arguing with others, but doing it well, that is, virtuously.
4. UP AND DOWN APPROACHES TO ARGUMENT
The path that I in fact followed from arguments to virtues was more of a long and
winding road, with a detour through what probably deserves to be called a “weird
methodology.”
The methodological challenge for argumentation theorists is that
argumentation is manifestly not a single phenomenon, nor even a single multifaceted phenomenon. It is a heterogeneous set of many different phenomena, many
of which are themselves multi-faceted. The great diversity of facets and phenomena
requires a plurality of paths into the discussion, and as a community we have
responded in kind. Logic, rhetoric, and dialectic may be the most prominent
approaches we have developed, but there are others. There are linguistic and
sociological dimensions to argumentation; the anthropology of argumentation is no
less a part of a complete account of argumentation than its psychology; and even if
we accept the assumption that epistemology provides the ultimate telos of
argumentation, that does not license us to ignore the ethics of argumentation or its
juridical and political aspects.
We can draw a rough-and-ready distinction between two general classes of
strategies for approaching arguments, “top-down” and “bottoms-up.” Top-down
theorists begin with an idea of what an argument is or ought to be. That conception
can then serve up criteria for what makes a given argument praiseworthy.
Normative principles for good argumentation can be extracted by a straightforward
4
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conceptual analysis and then deployed in particular cases. In practice, the initial
conceptualization does not have to be held as fully sacrosanct, and the give-and-take
between the initial assumptions and the results from application will sharpen or
otherwise enhance the initial concepts. There is room for the dynamics that lead to
reflective equilibrium and a stable theory that is yet capable of further evolution.
The proof of the work of top-down theorists can be found in the templates
they have provided and the principles that have emerged. A lot of first-rate
theorizing falls under this rubric and there is no denying the extraordinary
magnitude and extent of the successes that have been achieved this way.
We have also been the beneficiaries of very impressive contributions by
those working from the other end of the spectrum. The technology is in place for
dedicated researchers to make a thorough corpus analysis or to conduct extensive
empirical studies, and we are fortunate to have such careful scholars among us
whose hard work and systematic data collection transcend the inherent biases of
anecdotal data selection.
The proof of the work of bottoms-up theorists can also be found in the
principles that have emerged and the templates they have provided. A lot of firstrate theorizing falls under this rubric and there is no denying the extraordinary
magnitude and extent of the successes that have been achieved this way.
5. THE WEIRD ROAD TO VIRTUES
Lacking the rigor and analytical insights of Top-down theorists as well as the
perseverance and synthesizing abilities needed for empirical Bottoms-up research, I
have had to cobble together a mixed approach. Beginning at one end, I have focused
on what I suppose are “weird” arguments in the hopes that something about the
entire class can be discerned from exploring the outliers, oddities, extreme cases,
and pathological deformities that mark the boundaries. I have mentioned one class
already, Backfiring Arguments, but I have also been intrigued by such curious
examples as:
 Arguing with God where you know you can’t win;
 Arguing with Oneself where you really can’t lose;
 Walkover Arguments where you win too easily, but there might not be
anything to win;
 Academic Arguments where it seems no one ever really wins, but
there’s really not much at stake to win or lose, anyway;
 Filibusters where one party refuses to play at all – and makes sure that
no one else gets to play either;
 Desperation Arguments where normal strategies can be thrown out
the window because you’ve almost certainly lost already so there’s
nothing left to lose;
 Misbegotten Arguments where there’s an argument, but there
shouldn’t be one, so simply choosing to argue is already an
argumentative failure;
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 Impossible Arguments that cannot be won by argumentation and can
only be resolved by something other than argument, e.g., by a
wholesale, radical epistemic conversion rather than a more localized
standpoint adjustment – but have to be argued regardless;
 Missing Arguments where there’s no argument, but there should be
one, so in this case it is the decision NOT to argue that is the
argumentative failure;
 Misfit Arguments by the wrong people in the wrong place at the wrong
time about the wrong thing, i.e, arguments that are Misplaced,
Displaced, and Out-of-place.
I find all of these cases individually fascinating, and collectively helpful when
thinking about all the different aspects of arguments and all the ways that things can
wrong in an argument. In each case, something is deficient or completely missing
that should be there or else something is exaggerated or present that shouldn’t be
there at all. These arguments are unsatisfying, regardless of whether they merit any
of the honorifics we normally bestow on arguments, like valid or sound or cogent or
kosher.
The job then becomes one of trying to locate the intruding or missing pieces
that make the argument less than fully satisfying. That is, these examples lead us to
ask: What virtue is missing? And What vice is present?
And that returns us to the earlier question as to what it would be for an
argument to be fully satisfying. What would make an argument satisfying to the
point that the participants could say at the end, “Now that was a good argument”?
An awful lot of pieces have to fall into place for an argument to be that good.
6. “NOW THAT WAS A GOOD ARGUMENT.”
The most obvious – and most important – thing to say about an argument that is so
good that in the end the arguers agree on how good the argument was, is that it
must have some extraordinary arguers! It is an exceptional arguer who can see the
epistemic gains to be had, and thus be satisfied by, losing an argument, and it is
equally admirable for a winning arguers to appreciate the contributions made by
her opponent to whatever epistemic gains she has made.
The notion of an argument that is fully satisfying to its participants includes
more than epistemic gains. It has to at least extend to cognitive gains more broadly,
including emotional, ethical, and possibly aesthetic aspects as well. It is a
conceptually rich deposit for theorists to mine. In order to excavate that wealth we
need to decide what counts as an argument, who counts as a participant, and, most
of all, what counts as satisfying. I will begin with and focus on the last one because it
informs and integrates the other two.
We can take a cue for the idea of a fully satisfying argument from The
GoodWork project of psychologists Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, William Damon, and
Howard Gardner (The GoodWork Project: http://goodworkproject.org). They note
that when we speak of “good work” we may have technical competence in mind: we
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hire master craftsmen precisely because they can be expected to do good work. We
might instead be commenting on whether it is engaging, rewarding, or satisfying for
the workers: we all want good jobs – good work – in that sense. And we could also be
judging that the work is ethical: people who volunteer their time in soup kitchens or
hospitals are doing good work. It is easy enough to separate the different senses – as
I have just done – but I think some damage is done both conceptually and practically
if we accept that fragmentation without any resistance. Our lives and works should
be more integrated than that.
The same thing needs to be said about good arguments. There is, of course,
great clarity to be gained by analytically distinguishing such elements as the
technical competence in arguments from the cognitive gains to be brought about by
arguing or the ideal conduct of arguers during arguments or the satisfactoriness of
its resolution. But there is also the potential cost of losing the forest for those trees.
Suppose, for example, we focus exclusively on technical competence,
something like inferential validity. It becomes all-too-easy to lose sight of the
dialectical, rhetorical, and other dimensions of argumentation. Here’s an example of
an argument offered by a leading logic text: “Both Pierre and Marie Curie were
physicists. Therefore, Marie Curie was a physicist.”3
Really? That’s your example of a good argument?!
I suppose it could serve as an example of a good inference, but as an argument, it
leaves so much to be desired that one wonders how it could even be offered as an
example of an argument in the first place. Only someone with logical blinders on –
like the author of an introductory logic text – would consider it. I cannot imagine
someone walking away from an exchange that include the words, “Both Pierre and
Marie Curie were physicists. Therefore, Marie Curie was a physicist,” saying to
herself, “Wow, that was one heck of a good argument!”
The relevant concept of an argument that is implicated by the robust concept
of a fully satisfying argument, therefore, cannot be the logical notion of a valid
inference. Good inferences do not by themselves make good arguments.
As an aside, and more controversially, I also think that bad inferences do not
necessarily ruin an argument. First, it would have to be recognizably bad inferences,
rather than merely invalid ones, that would disqualify an argument. But even that
might not be enough.
Under certain circumstances, it is not necessarily unreasonable to overlook
an argument’s flaws. One might, for example, resort to a meta-argument like this: “I
can see that the argument doesn’t work as it stands, but the conclusion is so attractive
that I’m sure someone will be able to fix it. I’ll accept this flawed one for now.” The
French mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré suggested that he sometimes
operated this way: accepting a formula as a provisional lemma in proving theorems
before he had any proof for that lemma.
There is a negative counterpart to the reasoning here that is actually fairly
common: a meta-argument for rejecting apparently good arguments, the “MARGA
gambit.” We find it on display whenever someone rejects a supposed sophistry
without being able to identify the specific problem: “I can’t find anything wrong with
3
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this proof that 1=0, but I know that can’t be right, so I’m confident that a competent
mathematician could find the error, so I’ll reject it even though it looks perfectly good
to me.”
Valid reasoning is apparently neither necessary nor sufficient for an
acceptable argument. Still, the degree of acceptability is limited. Provisionally
accepting an unproved lemma falls well short of “fully satisfying.” Fully satisfying is
a very high standard.
Similar examples can be found or generated to show that exclusively
rhetorical, dialectical, epistemological, or ethical criteria for good argumentation
also fail to capture the robust concept. Winning arguments, for example, do not
necessarily qualify as good arguments in this rich sense: If the loser of an agonistic
does not walk away satisfied – and how often does that happen? – then there is
some dissatisfaction, so it is not fully satisfying. For that matter, how often is the
nominal winner of an argument satisfied? If there is nothing to gain from a
“walkover argument” against an overmatched or incompetent opponent, at least
from an epistemic perspective, then whatever satisfaction is to be had is limited.
Even rationally persuasive arguments can leave a bad taste in one’s mouth. Again,
this is a very high standard.
Virtuous argumentation does fare better on this count if only because the
arguers will have the appreciable satisfaction of having argued well. But even then, I
shall argue, something is still be missing.
To be fair, argumentation theorists have generally avoided these sorts of
one-dimensional characterizations of what makes a good argument, so admittedly I
am taking shots at an army of Straw Men here. But I can always use the reminder to
widen my perspective. The concept of a good argument is a complex, multi-faceted
one. In the jargon of contemporary philosophy, it is a “thick” concept: it
encompasses both strictly descriptive components and loaded normative ones.
7. THE CAST OF ARGUERS
If we are going to invoke the idea of an argument that is fully satisfying, we cannot
then turn around and think of arguments as abstract structures of propositions. For
starters, there have be arguers to be (or fail to be) satisfied. And we need to expand
the category of “arguer” to include everyone who is relevant for the judgment that
an argument is, or is not, fully satisfying. Two criteria for relevance present
themselves:
(1)
(2)

anyone who has the standing to evaluate the argument itself as being
satisfactory or not.
anyone whose conduct is properly subject to being evaluated as
satisfactory or not.

By and large, these criteria identify many of the same people. The proponents of a
standpoint and their opponents are included by these criteria, and so are any thirdparty interlocutors. In addition, these criteria also include judges, juries, and
interested spectators. In some contexts, it would make sense to extend the list even
8
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further so as to include any party with an interest in the outcome, but it might be
best not to open that can or worms now – if only because when the argument
concerns environmental issues, actual worms could qualify as interested parties and
therefore participants in the argument. Let it suffice for the moment simply to
emphasize that when it comes to including different perspective in the overall
evaluation of an argument, the wider the net, the better.
In another context, I labelled some of these other parties “non-combatants”
to distinguish them from the primary protagonists (Cohen, forthcoming). Part of the
reason for that terminology was to exploit the dominant argument–is-war
metaphor, and to show that despite its significant defects – and the significant
pleasure that many of us have had in pointing out those defects – there is still new
and useful meaning to be extracted from the argument-is-war metaphor. The idea of
non-combatants implicates the related concept of “collateral damage” – and that is
an idea that can fruitfully be transplanted from the military sphere to the discourse
of argumentation. Here, however, I will label them “supporting actors” in order to
highlight their secondary roles as well as their secondary contributions to the overall
performance.
Each of the two criteria just noted provides a compelling reason to count
these supporting actors alongside proponents and their opponents as part of the
cast of characters in an argument. First, they have a stake in the argument. Thus,
they have the standing to make a judgment as to the satisfactoriness of the
argument. They may not have as much to say about the argument as the proponents
and opponents but that does not mean that they don’t have anything to say.
Consider a legal case: If the judge and jury are not satisfied with the argumentation,
that tells us something; if the defendants or plaintiffs have complaints about their
counsels’ argumentation, that matters, too; and if the spectators find it lacking, that
also counts.
Second, in addition to having a stake in the argument, the supporting actors
add something of their own to the argument. And it cuts both ways. Knowledgeable
audiences, fair-minded judges, and conscientious juries can be significant, positive
factors in the success of an argument. Conversely, incoherent proponents and
intransigent opponents are not the only ones who can spoil an argument; biased
arbitrators, incompetent juries, and uninformed, unappreciative, or ill-behaved
audiences have that power, too.
8. DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS
In addition to the two antecedent reasons for counting supporting actors as arguers,
namely their stakes in the outcome and their contributing roles in producing that
outcome, there is an another benefit to thinking along these lines that gives a degree
of posterior confirmation to that decision. It casts a bright light that clarifies the role
of the virtues in argumentation and thereby brings the concept of an arguer’s
virtues into clearer focus. In so doing, it highlights the strengths of virtue an
analytical tool.
At the same time, however, it also reveals limits to what virtue
argumentation theory can do.
9
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First, the positive part: the core ideas of Virtue Argumentation Theory, as I
understand it, can fit on a couple of bumper stickers. First,
For a good argument, argue well.
The grammatical shift from the adjective “good” to the adverb “well” signals a
change in focus from the argument as a product to the arguer as an agent. Virtue
Argumentation Theory zeroes in on the conduct of the arguers, rather than on
propositions, rules, inferences, procedures, or even outcomes, as the heart of
argument evaluation. Everything else branches off from there. The second bumpersticker slogan is:
Arguing well requires good arguers.
The return to an adjective, applying now to the arguers, signals that the admirable
conduct of arguers ought to stem from virtues, inculcated habits of mind, rather
than be accidental or occasional manifestations.
Why does this matter? Isn’t an accidentally produced good argument just as
good as a virtuously produced one? Even if we ignore the equivocation on both
“good” and “argument” in this question, the answer is still “No” and for the same
reasons that accidentally true beliefs do not count as knowledge. 4 Otherwise,
arguers would not have the requisite “ownership” of their arguments, a relation that
grounds responsibility and the assignment of blame and credit.
And now, when we turn to asking what the virtues are that ground the role
for virtues in argumentation, the earlier discussion comes back to bite us: having
recognized so many different arguers, we have to acknowledge the possibility of
different skill sets and different, possibly even incompatible virtues. Hilary
Kornblith, in a delightfully provocative essay called “Distrusting Reason,” gave voice
to this idea:
Reason-giving requires a wide range of skills that need not be present in the
reasons-responsive person… the ability to form one’s beliefs in a way that is
responsive to evidence is not at all the same as the ability to present reasons for
one’s beliefs. (Kornblith, 1999, p. 277)

The idea can be extended even further to spectators:
When we think of someone who argues well as someone who marshals evidence,
correctly draws inferences, and presents it well, we are putting them in the
proponent’s chair. Why not someone with whom it is good to argue, e.g., by listening
well and asking the right questions, then accepts well-reasoned argumentation?

An opponent’s ability to identify weaknesses in an argument are not always
coincident with the ability to construct reasons in support of already adopted
conclusions; neither must a judge necessarily have those proponent virtues; and
open-mindedness, sometimes cited as the arguer’s virtue par excellence (Hare,
1985) can actually be detrimental to the proponent’s more partisan task (Miller &
Cohen, 2008).

4
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9. DIFFERENT ARGUERS – AND DIFFERENT ARGUMENTS
I said earlier that in order to extract meaning from the concept of a fully satisfying
argument, we need to decide what counts as an argument, who counts as a
participant, and what counts as satisfying. Starting with satisfaction, we were led to
expand the concept of an arguer. Now, with the wide array of arguer-roles to
consider, and each with its own skill-set and accompanying virtues, does the idea of
an argument also have to grow a little? I think so, but not in ways that pose any
significant problems for the virtues approach. If we think there are relevantly
different kinds of arguments, Virtue Argumentation Theory can be easily adapted
because it already accommodates a plurality of virtues. On the other hand, the
plurality in Virtue Argumentation Theory is no obstacle to integration because even
if we discern a single telos covering all kinds of argumentation, that need not
translate into a single telos for all arguers.
And yet, in the end I would like to suggest that the common concept of an
argument does need some expansion, not enlarge the range or extension of the
concept, but rather to include its context.
10. CONCLUSION: MISE-EN-SCENE
Admittedly, many of the details are missing from this basic framework for thinking
about completely satisfying arguments. Questions such as just which virtues are
needed for the different roles in arguments, how they might relate to one another,
how conflicts among them be resolved, and how they differ from skills, have all been
side-stepped here – mostly because all of them have been addressed at length by
others elsewhere. What is missing and has not been addressed at length is precisely
the context for an argument.
When it comes to satisfying arguments, the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts, especially if the only parts we recognize as relevant are the arguers
themselves. The venue matters. Evaluating an argument apart from its context is
analogous to evaluating the inferential part of an argument, its illative core, apart
from its dialectical tier: there are important things to be said about it, but there is
more to the story. The wrong time or place can be as detrimental to the success of
an argument as bad arguers. But so can the wrong arguers, not matter how good
they are. And the same needs to be said about the subject matter, for if we lack the
standing to effect the changes called for by the consensus that we reach, that too
detracts from its satisfactoriness. So, unless we extend the concept of virtue to apply
to contexts, and then talk about the “virtues of venues,” virtue theory will not be
enough. And that is inadvisable because it would require irreparable damage to the
concept of a virtue as an inculcated habit of character.
Let me end, then, back where I began, with the virtues of OSSA.
It is no accident that there would be satisfying arguments here at this
conference because it is the right place and the right time to argue, and we are the
right people for arguing about the subjects of the arguments that will take place
over the next few days.
And besides, good arguments at OSSA? That’s the tradition!
11
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